The fiscal costs of financial instability revisited by Eschenbach, Felix & Schuknecht, Ludger
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
WORKING PAPER SERIES
ECB EZB EKT BCE EKP
WORKING PAPER NO. 191
THE FISCAL COSTS OF FINANCIAL
INSTABILITY REVISITED
BY FELIX ESCHENBACH AND
LUDGER SCHUKNECHT
November 2002* The authors are grateful for comments from an anonymous referee, from ECB colleagues, in particular Ana Lamo, Phillipine Cour, Philipp Rother, Guido Wolswijk Mika Tujula, Jose
Marin,Ignazio Angeloni and Benjamin Sahel,from Paul Van Den Noord and the participants of the OECD economics department research seminar,George Kopits and participants
of the IMFís FAD seminar, Juergen Von Hagen, Lars Jonung, Harry Huizinga, the IFO Institute seminar participants, and from Jonas Agell, Peter Englund, Peter Jennergren, Klas-
Goeran Larsson, Bo Legerius, Goeran Lind, and Yngve Lindh.Valuable research assistance by Gerhard Schwab and editorial assistance by Anna Foden was highly appreciated.The
study reflects the personal opinions of the authors.It does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the European Central Bank.
Felix Eschenbach is Ph.D. Student at the Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam (mailto:eschenbach@few.eur.nl); Ludger Schuknecht is Principal Economist at the European Central Bank 
(e-mail:Ludger.Schuknecht@ecb.int).
WORKING PAPER NO. 191
THE FISCAL COSTS OF FINANCIAL
INSTABILITY REVISITED





WORKING PAPER SERIES© European Central Bank, 2001
Address Kaiserstrasse 29
D-60311 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Postal address Postfach 16 03 19
D-60066 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Telephone +49 69 1344 0
Internet http://www.ecb.int
Fax +49 69 1344 6000
Telex 411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank.





II. Asset Prices, Financial Instability and the Transmission to Fiscal Variables 9
a. The revenue channels 10
b. Bailout costs 12
c. Second-round effects 13
III. A panel analysis of the effects of asset prices and financial instability on fiscal accounts 15
IV. Two case studies: Sweden and the United Kingdom 17
a. A “Boom Bust Cyclel” in Sweden and the United Kingdom 18
b. Fiscal effects via the revenue channels 20
c. Bailout-costs: fiscal effects of Sweden’s financial crisis 26
d. Second round effects and putting fiscal costs via the three channels together 27
V. The Fiscal Costs of Financial instability across Industrialised Countries 29
VI. Conclusions 31
Bibliography 33
Annex Tables and Figures 35
European Central Bank Working Paper Series 41
ECB • Working Paper No 191 • November 2002 3Abstract:
This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of the fiscal costs of financial instability (defined as
major asset price changes and including, as extreme cases, financial crises).  The study identifies
three channels to fiscal accounts: 1) revenue effects on capital gains, asset turnover and
consumption tax, 2) bailout costs as asset price declines undermine balance sheets of
companies/banks, and 3) second-round effects from asset prices changes via the real economy and
via debt service costs.
A panel analysis and case studies show that episodes of financial instability increase the variability
of fiscal balances. Moreover, fiscal costs are often very large and much larger than assumed in the
literature so far with public debt rising by up to 50% of GDP during such episodes.  These fiscal
effects can also serve as a, so far under-emphasised, rationale for the deficit and debt targets in the
EU￿s Maastricht Treaty and Stability and Growth Pact.
Keywords:  Fiscal policies, deficits, asset prices, financial stability, financial crisis
JEL codes:  H3, H6, E6
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The sensitivity of fiscal balances to economic and non-economic shocks has received
renewed attention since the introduction of deficit and debt limits in the EU with the Maastricht
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. By contrast, few studies have so far systematically
analysed the relationship between asset prices, private financial balance sheets and financial
instability on the one hand and fiscal balances on the other. Schuknecht and Eschenbach (2002)
discuss and examine econometrically the revenue effects of asset price changes in industrialised
countries. Caprio and Klingebiel (in their seminal 1996 paper) and Honohan and Klingebiel (2000)
report the direct fiscal costs of bank bailouts in the context of financial crisis. This shortage of
studies is surprising given that episodes of financial instability and crisis have coincided with some
of the most serious deteriorations in fiscal balances in recent decades.
This paper attempts to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the fiscal costs of asset
price changes and financial instability. It argues that major financial instability (defined as periods of
large asset price swings) or even financial crisis (periods with financial instability and government
support for the financial system) can also bring about significant fiscal instability.
To determine the fiscal effects of financial instability, the paper first analyses the
transmission channels from asset price changes (via private financial balance sheets) to fiscal
variables.  We distinguish three main channels.  First, asset price changes affect fiscal revenue via
capital gains taxes and wealth-based taxes, via capital transaction taxes and via wealth effects on
consumption and hence indirect taxes.  These effects can result in much more volatility in fiscal
balances than output fluctuations alone even without major financial instability.  Second, asset price
changes can undermine private sector financial balance sheets to such an extent that companies
and/or financial institutions seek and receive government support.  Thirdly, there are second round
effects, whereby deteriorating/improving private financial balance sheets adversely/positively affect
output via falling investment, employment and consumption which, in turn, affect public finances.
Moreover, changes in fiscal balances affect the level of debt and, possibly, refinancing conditions,
and thereby interest expenditure on public debt.
In a next step, the paper conducts a panel analysis on 20 OECD countries for the 1982-2001
period. Although the results do not provide estimates of fiscal costs in percent of GDP (a measure
ECB • Working Paper No 191 • November 2002 5that is much liked by the policy-oriented literature) they provide a first illustration of the relevance of
the transmission channels and the sensitivity of fiscal accounts to financial instability.
Subsequently, the paper examines empirically the fiscal costs of major financial instability
by conducting case studies of the boom-bust cycles in Sweden and the United Kingdom in the late
1980s to early 1990s.  We identify those changes in revenue variables that cannot be explained by
cyclical variations in output and discretionary fiscal policy measures alone.  We argue that these
unexplained residuals (which are strongly correlated with the boom-bust cycles) exacerbated the
variability of fiscal accounts.  The revenue effects together with the bailout costs of financial and
non-financial institutions, the fiscal effects of the output loss during the ￿bust￿, and the increase in
the interest burden are also argued to approximate the fiscal costs of financial instability and crisis in
these two cases.  Fiscal costs are estimated at around 15% of GDP in the UK and Sweden.
We also look at public debt developments as an alternative measure of the fiscal costs of
financial instability in a number of financial instability episodes in industrialised countries. Public
debt has been increasing by 10 to 50 percent of GDP during such episodes.  We decompose this
￿gross￿ increase into denominator effects (due to lower growth) and numerator effects (on annual
fiscal balances due to the three transmissions channels identified above). Even when adjusting such
figures for denominator effects of lower growth, fiscal costs range from almost 10 to 32% of GDP.
For both Sweden and the United Kingdom, the figures calculated in this manner are broadly
consistent with those of the case studies. Both approaches show that the fiscal costs of bank bailouts
alone are only a fraction of the full fiscal costs of instability.
In short, important asset price changes and financial instability can have major effects on
fiscal accounts, raising the variability of fiscal accounts and the public debt ratio. These two features
of many instability episodes provide further justification for the EU Stability and Growth Pact￿s
deficit target of ￿close to balance or in surplus￿. The latter provides some safety margin for fiscal
balance deteriorations (even if sometimes not enough to prevent large deficits).  It also implies a
continuous decline in public debt which, together with the Maastricht Treaty￿s debt ceiling of 60% of
GDP, generates a safety margin against the potential threat to sustainability from large debt
increases.
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The sensitivity of fiscal balances to economic and non-economic shocks has received
renewed attention since the introduction of a fiscal institutional framework including deficit and debt
limits in the EU with the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. There is by now a
considerable literature that examines the effects of economic fluctuations on fiscal variables and the
budget balance (e.g., van den Noord, 2000; Bouthevillain et al, 2001).  The design of the ￿close to
balance or in surplus￿ clause is closely linked to the need for allowing cyclical fluctuations in budget
balances due to automatic stabilisers and to contain overall deficit and debt. In addition, political
economy variables such as elections, institutions, terms of trade shocks and special events (such as
natural disasters or German unification) have helped explain fiscal balances and their changes
(literature on political business cycles, fiscal institutions).
By contrast, few studies have so far systematically analysed the relationship between asset
prices, private financial balance sheets and financial instability on the one hand and fiscal balances
on the other. Schuknecht and Eschenbach (2002) discuss and examine econometrically the revenue
effects of asset price changes in industrialised countries. Caprio and Klingebiel (in their seminal
1996 paper) and Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) report the direct fiscal costs of bank bailouts in the
context of financial crisis. This shortage of studies is surprising given that episodes of financial
instability and crisis have coincided with some of the most serious deteriorations in fiscal balances in
recent decades.
This paper attempts to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the fiscal costs of asset
price changes and financial instability, and in how far such episodes affect the variability of fiscal
accounts. It argues that major financial instability (defined as periods of large asset price swings) or
even financial crisis (periods with financial instability and government support for the financial
system) can also bring about significant fiscal instability.
To determine the fiscal effects of financial instability, the paper first analyses the
transmission channels from asset price changes (via private financial balance sheets) to fiscal
variables.  We distinguish three main channels.  First, asset price changes affect fiscal revenue via
capital gains taxes and wealth-based taxes, via capital transaction taxes and via wealth effects on
ECB • Working Paper No 191 • November 2002 7consumption and hence indirect taxes.  These effects are analysed in detail in Eschenbach and
Schuknecht (2002) who find significant such effects in many OECD countries. They can result in
much more volatility in fiscal balances than output fluctuations alone even without major financial
instability.  Second, asset price changes can undermine private sector financial balance sheets to such
an extent that companies and/or financial institutions seek and receive government support (Caprio
and Klingebiel, 1996 & Honohan and Klingebiel, 2000).  Thirdly, there are second round effects,
whereby deteriorating/improving private financial balance sheets adversely/positively affect output
via falling investment, employment and consumption which, in turn, affect public finances.
Moreover, changes in fiscal balances affect the level of debt and, possibly, refinancing conditions,
and thereby interest expenditure on public debt.
In a next step, the paper conducts a panel analysis on 20 OECD countries for the 1982-2001
period.  We test for the three transmission channels of asset price and financial instability effects on
fiscal balances and public debt.  Although these results do not provide estimates of fiscal costs in
percent of GDP (a measure that is much liked by the policy-oriented literature) they provide a first
illustration of the relevance of the transmission channels and the sensitivity of fiscal accounts to
financial instability.
Subsequently, the paper examines empirically the fiscal costs of major financial instability
by conducting case studies of the boom-bust cycles in Sweden and the United Kingdom in the late
1980s to early 1990s.  We identify those changes in revenue variables that cannot be explained by
cyclical variations in output and discretionary fiscal policy measures alone.  We argue that these
unexplained residuals (which are strongly correlated with the boom-bust cycles) exacerbated the
variability of fiscal accounts.  The revenue effects together with the bailout costs of financial and
non-financial institutions, the fiscal effects of the output loss during the ￿bust￿, and the increase in
the interest burden are also argued to approximate the fiscal costs of financial instability and crisis in
these two cases.  Fiscal costs, according to this approach are around 15% of GDP in the UK and
Sweden.
We also look at public debt developments as an alternative measure of the fiscal costs of
financial instability in a number of financial instability episodes in industrialised countries. Public
debt has been increasing by 10 to 50 percent of GDP during such episodes.  We decompose this
ECB • Working Paper No 191 • November 2002 8￿gross￿ increase into denominator effects (due to lower growth) and numerator effects (on annual
fiscal balances due to the three transmissions channels identified above). The latter could be called
the growth-adjusted debt increase that is due to financial instability.
In short, the study sheds light on fiscal effects of financial instability from a number of
angles: the next section discusses the transmission channels. Section 3 presents a panel analysis of
the relevance of these channels.  Section 4 provides two case studies on Sweden and the United
Kingdom.  Section 5 analyses the fiscal costs of episodes of financial instability in terms of the
related deterioration in the public debt position. Section 5 concludes by also discussing the role of
deficits and debt limits as present in the EU￿s fiscal institutional framework.
II.  Asset Prices, Financial Instability and the Transmission to Fiscal Variables
In this section we discuss the transmission channels from changes in asset prices via private
sector financial balance sheets to public finances.
1  We want to focus in particular on episodes of
financial instability and crisis.  The former are defined as periods of major asset price volatility
where typically a period of asset price growth (boom) is followed by a major downturn (bust).  The
latter are defined as episodes where liquidity/solvency problems in the banking systems induce
governments to provide public support (bailouts).
We will discuss three channels by which asset price changes and financial instability can
affect fiscal variables; i) revenue channels whereby in particular capital gains and wealth-effect
related consumption taxes are affected by instability; ii) bailout costs when governments decide to
cover instability-related balance sheet losses; and iii) second round effects when asset price and
financial balance sheet changes affect fiscal variables via second round effects on investment,
consumption and employment.
Formally, these three channels can be represented as follows:
() ( ) () b r w Y t w bailout w t w t c t w t FB t w w c w p ∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ − + ∆ = ∆      ) (         ) (         1   σ ,
                   [               channel 1                   ]             [   channel 2   ]           [       channel 3         ]
                                                         
1 Of course it is not only asset price changes that affect private sector financial balances. Other factors include interest rates,
exchange rates, etc.  Nevertheless asset prices have the most direct effect and they are often also correlated with other
variables.  For example, higher interest rates typically result in lower asset prices and in higher debt service costs.
ECB • Working Paper No 191 • November 2002 9where FBp is the fiscal balance and the first three elements on the right of the equation
reflect the revenue channel where tw is the tax on changes in wealth/balance sheets ∆w (following
asset price changes and financial instability), tccw is the indirect tax revenue from wealth effect
induced consumption, and tt is the turnover tax on capital transactions.  Bailout (∆w) stands for the
takeover of balance sheet losses and t∆Y(∆w) represents the tax revenue from second round effects.
The increase in interest expenditure on growing public debt is reflected by the simplified term r∆b
(that does not reflect changes in financing conditions).
Note, however, that episodes of instability and crisis are only the extreme cases along a
continuum of increasing instability. Or in other words, small instability with limited changes in asset
prices and private financial balance sheets can also have effects on public finances. As asset price
fluctuations grow, instability rises and the implications for private financial balance sheets become
more important.  Fiscal effects of such events also start becoming more important and more
distinguishable from other influences on public finances. Hence, the fiscal effects of financial
instability are best to be discussed along a spectrum of growing instability (see Fig. 1).
Figure 1: Asset price changes, financial instability and fiscal costs
a.  The revenue channels
Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002) describe in detail the channels by which asset price















ECB • Working Paper No 191 • November 2002 10related taxes. These are typically recorded as part of direct taxes on households and
corporations.
2 Personal income taxes may be affected in four ways: if the capital gains from private
asset sales are taxed, if asset price effects on profits and dividends feed into personal income taxes, if
(taxable) rental income changes with asset prices, and if interest payments (e.g. on mortgages) are
tax deductible. Revenue from corporate income taxes is also likely to be affected by asset price
changes if related gains affect the taxable base. And given growing internationalisation of asset
holdings, fiscal variables are not only affected by domestic asset price fluctuations and financial
instability.  A company holding assets abroad may have to pay tax on capital gains or may be able to
write off losses against tax obligations at home.
Secondly, changes in private financial balances affect consumption and thereby indirect
taxes via wealth effects. Household and firms feel richer when the value of their assets rises, even if
they do not realize the profits, and confidence is likely to be affected positively. Moreover, credit-
worthiness of households and firms improves as the value of collateral rises.  These effects stimulate
consumption and (less importantly for immediate tax effects) investment.
3
Thirdly, governments often draw revenue from transactions in assets, in the form of
turnover taxes.  These taxes are important especially regarding real estate transactions and can
reach a noticeable share of total revenue.  To our knowledge, there is no industrial country that does
not tax real estate transactions while many countries have abolished stock turnover taxes in recent
years.
As these channels are based on the tax system they are likely to arise already for small asset
price changes.  Effects become more important as asset price changes and financial instability
increase.  However, as countries￿ tax systems differ, such effects have also been found to differ
considerably across countries, depending on tax bases and rates. Moreover, the more capital/assets
are taxed, the more dispersed ownership of assets and the more frequently tax bases are adjusted to
changing market values of the assets, the higher the likely fiscal effects of asset price changes.
Finally, revenue effects from financial instability are likely to be more or less symmetric, i.e., rising
asset prices and improving financial balances will improve fiscal balances and vice versa.
                                                         
2 In principle, wealth taxes could also be relevant, but they have become unimportant in most industrialised countries.
3 Recent literature has given more attention to wealth effects across assets and countries. See , for example, Case, Quigley
and Shiller, 2001; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001; or Ludwig and Slok, 2002.
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affects the fiscal balance by on average 0.4% of GDP in most industrialised OECD countries with
values ranging from 0.1 and 0.8 % of GDP depending on the country.
b.  Bailout costs
Asset price changes can by themselves or in conjunction with other adverse developments
(such as higher interest rates, higher taxes) undermine the soundness of private financial balance
sheets to the extent that agents (companies, households) have negative equity and become
illiquid/insolvent. If agents cannot (or become unwilling to) service their loans, this could generate
non-performing loans in financial institutions, thereby, undermining the net-worth of banks as well.
If asset price declines take on major proportions and are coupled with corporate and/or financial
sector difficulties, this degree of financial instability can give rise to additional significant fiscal
costs to the government.  These arise from helping out insolvent companies and banks. If an asset
price fall results in difficulties for the corporate sector, the government may be burdened by called-
up guarantees on loans.  If the industry is important for political reasons (say as an important
regional employer), the government may be inclined/pressured to provide subsidies or other types of
emergency assistance.  Most importantly perhaps, the government may have implicit or explicit
contingent liabilities in the financial system. Individual banks ￿too big to fail￿ or systemic risks to
the whole financial system can make it impossible for a government to avoid a ￿bail-out￿. Such costs
can be very significant in quantitative terms and have reached double-digit shares of GDP in many
emerging market and developing countries in the past (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996).
4
However, such bailouts typically affect public finances through other channels than
revenues. They can take the form of budgetary subsidies which are paid directly to companies to stay
afloat. Alternatively, governments can give out guarantees which can be called-up later (thereby
possibly postponing the visible costs). Financial transactions instead of budgetary measures are often
employed to recapitalise banks and companies.  One possibility for governments is to purchase
newly issued capital (equity injections). This activity would be recorded as a financial transaction
                                                         
4 Conceptually, bailouts of  balance-sheet losses are equivalent to taxes on capital gains.  The difference is
mainly the ad hoc nature of the extent and timing of a bailout (as compared to  an ￿orderly￿ deduction of
balance sheet losses in income tax statements of corporations).
ECB • Working Paper No 191 • November 2002 12that raises public debt but not the deficit. Alternatively, governments can purchase bad loans via a
holding company. After completion of its task the holding company can be liquidated (or
recapitalised) with the government footing the bill. If the holding company is liquidated,
governments may book its losses as a debt takeover which raises public debt but never affects the
deficit. Only when the recapitalisation is regularised in the budget (e.g. under subsidies) will it raise
the deficit.
The Asian crisis of the late 1990s but also financial crisis in some industrial countries have
painfully exposed the importance of asset price boom and bust cycles in contributing to financial
sector difficulties and subsequent large and costly public bail-outs.
It is worth noting that fiscal policies and the rules governing bailouts affect the likelihood
that such costs arise (Gropp and Vesala, 2000).  Many observers claim that--in the absence of clear
rules--implicit government guarantees in the financial sector exacerbated the boom-bust cycle and
financial sector problems in the Asian crisis.  The latter had given rise to excessive risk taking by
banks, households and firms.  As households and firms had easier access to credits, asset prices rose
more than they would have in the absence of  ￿easy money￿.  Similarly, the prospect of a ￿bail-out￿
for ￿politically important￿ companies (e.g., housing and building companies) can also lead to moral
hazard which, in turn, can affect asset prices.
5
c.  Second-round effects
There are also likely to be second round effects on fiscal variables, particularly when
significant financial instability feeds back into the macroeconomy.  For example, when house prices
rise and agents feel richer they consume and invest more (first round effects on revenue as discussed
above).  This will raise output which feeds back into employment and further consumption. This in
turn will boost direct and income tax receipt while lowering unemployment related outlays (second
round effects).  A major asset price downturn is likely to have the opposite effect.  Agents feel
poorer (i.e. they have a lower net worth and hence less collateral), adjust their consumption and
investment activity downward, with adverse effects on public finances.
                                                         
5 Fiscal policies also affect asset prices via the tax and subsidy system (for a short discussion, see
Eschenbach and Schuknecht, 2002).
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Asset price volatility makes it more difficult for lenders to screen out good from bad borrowers as
the net worth of a company (an indicator of creditworthiness) is highly volatile and may even
become negative. Moreover, a stock market decline, for example, could leave borrowers with little
(net worth) to lose and therefore become reckless at the lenders expense.  These adverse selection
and moral hazard problems would lead to a contraction in lending and economic activity (Mishkin
and White, 2002).
These second round effects can have an even more pronounced effect on the public debt
ratio as higher deficits raise public debt (numerator effect) and lower output reduces the GDP against
which debt is assessed (denominator effect).  As a result of a higher debt ratio, the public interest
burden is likely to rise as well.  This effect is magnified if in a situation of instability, a large share of
existing debt needs to be refinanced and if the refinancing conditions deteriorate.
6
Here, the fiscal impact of bailouts on first and second-round effects is worth discussing
briefly.  On the one hand, the costs of bailouts are likely to be significant.  On the other hand,
bailouts can help repair companies￿ or banks￿ balance-sheets.  Thereby, they help re-establish a
company￿s ability to pay taxes more quickly than in a scenario when losses have to feed fully
through corporate and bank balance sheets.  Moreover, second round effects are likely to be smaller.
Especially if the financial sector is bailed out so that balance sheets are repaired more quickly,
output-enhancing lending is likely to resume earlier.  In this regard, figure 1 is not quite precise as
higher bail-out costs may offset partly first and second round effects on revenue.  This trade-off,
however, is unlikely to apply when a bailout undermines the sustainability of public finances and
private agents start adjusting their consumption and investment decisions accordingly.
Finally, it is worth noting that along the spectrum of instability, the relevance of the different
transmission channels differs.  Some revenue effects are relatively immediate and automatically
linked to asset price and financial balance changes.
 7  Second round effects and bail-out costs only
￿kick in￿ once (probably country and case dependent) threshold values of instability are exceeded.
                                                         
6 Financing conditions for Swedish public debt, for example, deteriorated significantly during this country￿s
financial turmoil of the early 1990s.
7 But the effect of such limited instability may be hardly measurable and distinguishable from cyclical effects,
discretionary measures and other ￿noise￿ that affects fiscal variables.
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A panel analysis for 20 OECD countries for the 1982-2001 period can illustrate the
importance of asset price changes, financial instability and bailout costs for public deficits and debt.
We will hence estimate the following linear models with fixed country effects:
a)  ∆deficit = αX + βY + ε
b)  ∆debt    = αX + βZ+ ε
The variables ∆deficit and ∆debt stand for the change in general government deficit and total
debt, scaled by GDP. X is a vector of n-1 country dummies and a constant needed for a fixed effects
model. Y is vector of variables that is assumed to determine general government deficit changes. It
includes real output growth, changes in interest expenditure (in percent of GDP), asset price changes
(stock and property price variables, deflated), and bailout dummies. Z is a slightly modified version
of X and includes deficit instead of changes in interest expenditure and a different property price
variable. The data are annual (for further details see the Data Appendix).
The change in the deficit and debt to GDP ratios are argued to be significantly correlated
with real growth.  This reflects the effect of cyclical fluctuations of the economy and (unfortunately
inseparably) also the above-described second round effects on the deficit and (via the deficit) on
public debt.  Second, variables reflecting the change in real estate and stock prices estimate the direct
effects from asset price changes and financial instability on revenue.  We apply two types of
variables, (i) the rate of change in the (CPI-adjusted) asset price variable and (ii) a dummy when the
asset price change is very large (i.e. over 10%/25% in real terms in one year for real estate/stock
prices).
We also introduced a number of dummy variables reflecting years where governments bailed
out banks in the sample countries.  Finally, the change of deficit estimation includes a public interest
expenditure variable, reflecting changing debt-service costs. The estimation of debt developments
includes the deficit as independent variable, as this determines the numerator  of the debt ratio
development.
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instability and fiscal accounts.  Table 1 gives an overview of our regression results, with coefficients,
t-values in brackets, and significance levels marked by asterisks. Columns 1 through 3 suggest that
coefficients of the growth variable are significant in explaining the change in the deficit ratio. The
magnitude of the coefficient is broadly in line with budget elasticity estimates elsewhere in the
literature.  Changes in the interest burden are also found to significantly affect the change in the
deficit.  Adding variables reflecting stock price changes and major real estate price declines
significantly improves the overall model fit.  The fact that only major declines in property prices
(rather than the regular property price variable) are significantly correlated with changes in the
deficit ratio may be due to the fact that capital loss deduction  and wealth effects on consumption
only become relevant above a certain threshold level of real estate price changes.  In column 3,
adding the Swedish bailout episodes proves relevant, also positively affecting different measures of
model fit.
8
Columns 4 through 6 display parameter estimates for the model with the change in debt as
the dependent variable. Growth and deficit are confirmed to be driving factors of debt changes.
There seems to be some additional impact from asset price changes beyond what￿s incorporated in
the deficit. Most bailout dummies also perform well, consistent with the hypotheses that  bailouts
may be regularised only with a lag (or not at all) in the budget, but immediately affect the debt to
GDP ratio.
Columns 7 and 8 replicate the models estimated in columns 3 and 6, using two-stage least
square as estimation technique. This takes account of the fact that growth may be jointly determined
with fiscal positions as it may be affected by automatic stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy
measures. We use a number of instruments including the lags of growth and find that the coefficients
of OLS regressions are confirmed while the significance level of coefficients declines marginally.
In sum we find support for the above formulated hypotheses, even though the results should
be seen mainly as illustrative evidence of the relevance of our claims and as an introduction to the
following case studies.
                                                         
8 This is consistent with the treatment of bailout costs as discussed in the next section.
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2 adj. 0.17 0.27 0.32 0.60 0.60 0.66 0.32 0.66
No. of obs. 374 301 301 379 292 292 300 292
1/one period lagged, *, **, *** = significance at 90, 95, 99 % level
IV. Two case studies: Sweden and the United Kingdom
The fiscal effects of asset price changes and related financial instability can be studied in a
number of ways.  Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002) focus on the first round effects on fiscal
revenue as described above when conducting an econometric analysis for 17 OECD countries.
Episodes with very significant financial instability, however, are perhaps better studied as case
studies to cover all channels and the unique features of each episode. We chose Sweden and the
United Kingdom to analyse the interaction between financial instability and public finances via asset
price effects on private financial balances and fiscal variables.  We find that fiscal balances first
improved and later deteriorated much more than what can be explained by cyclical influences and
discretionary policies alone.  Note that this was the case in both Sweden and the United Kingdom,
ECB • Working Paper No 191 • November 2002 17even though only in Sweden financial instability resulted in a full fledged financial crisis with a
government bailout of the banking system.
In the following sub-sections, we will first provide evidence on the boom-bust cycle in the late
1980s-early 1990s in these two countries.  Subsequently, we estimate the first-round fiscal
implications of the asset price boom and subsequent bust on the Swedish and British public accounts.
We look at various revenue categories and calculate the residual between actual revenue
developments and what can be explained with the help of cyclical developments and discretionary
policy measures.  In the case of Sweden, the budgetary costs of bank support (bailout costs) were
taken into consideration as well while in the UK such costs did not arise (despite the significant
financial instability and private financial balance problems as outlined below). Finally, we will
approximate second round fiscal costs via the fiscal effects of the bust related output loss and put
these together with the fiscal effects via the other two channels. We find significant fiscal costs in
both cases in the order of 13-14% of GDP, as compared, for example, to bailout costs in Sweden of
about 4% of GDP.
a.  A ￿Boom Bust Cycle￿ in Sweden and the United Kingdom
Both Sweden and the United Kingdom experienced strong growth in the second half of the
1980s accompanied by significant increases in house and stock prices.  This period was followed by
years of low and even negative growth accompanied by a sharp reversal of stock and real estate
prices in the early 1990s (Charts 1-3, see end of document).  The cumulative output loss as compared
to trend growth during the ￿bust￿ in Sweden amounted to over 10% of GDP and to almost 7% of
GDP in the United Kingdom.
Table 2: Sweden, Real After Tax Interest Rate in Selected Years
1980 1989 1991
1.  Nominal interest rate 14.0 14.0 14.0
2.  Tax effect 8.7 6.6 4.2
3.   Interest rate after tax (1.-2.) 5.3 7.4 9.8
4.   Inflation rate for coming year 12.3 10.2 2.6
5.  Real rate of after tax interest (3.-4.) -7.0 -2.8 7.2
Source: Agell, Englund, Soedersten (1998)
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the reversal in asset prices is available.  As shown in Table 2, real interest rates increased
significantly between 1989 and 1991.  This increase was particularly pronounced for house
purchases on credit for which the real after tax interest rate increased by about 10 percentage points
between 1989 and 1991 (Agell, Englund, Soedersten, 1998).  Throughout much of the 1980s, low
real interest rates and generous tax deductibility of interest payments caused the after tax interest rate
to be negative for house purchases. Lax lending practices resulting from increased banking
competition and from inappropriate prudential regulation and supervision appears to have
contributed to the bubble in the housing sector. Between 1989 and 1991, however, Sweden first
raised interest rates to defend its fixed exchange rate regime, and subsequently (after the exchange
rate was floated) kept interest rates high to reduce inflation.  At the height of the boom, the
government tightened the tax deduction regime and, thereby, also raised the real after tax interest
rate.   A reduction in specific housing subsidies exacerbated this effect.
9  Figure 2 contains a
simplified illustration of the transmission channels from fiscal and monetary policies to asset (and in
particular real estate) prices which caused the Swedish ￿bubble￿ to burst.   The strong asset price
adjustment put significant pressure on corporate and financial sector balance sheets.  A financial
crisis emerged, and the government had to provide significant support to troubled banks (see Jonung,
1994 and Jonung, Soderstrom and Stymne, 1996 and Jonung and Stymne, 1997 for a more detailed
discussion).
Figure 2: Sweden, Factors Contributing to Bursting of Asset Price Bubble
tax deductibility
of interest payments                            specific housing                construction sector
reduced                                                 subsidies reduced             collapses
sharp increase in real                drop in asset price, profit           asset price bubble
after tax  interest rate                and growth expectations            bursts
restrictive monetary
policy
                                                         
9 The relative importance of monetary, fiscal and other policies in the propagation of the Swedish boom-bust
cycle is difficult to judge, though monetary and financial deregulation related policies seem to have been most
relevant.  For detailed quantitative information about the 1990/91 tax reform see Kristofferson (1995).
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asset prices is similar to the Swedish case as the earlier charts illustrate. Striking similarities can also
be noted with respect to economic policy. After the mid-1980s, monetary policies became more
accomodative (as monetary policies became exchange rate oriented) and resulted in significant
money growth.  Following German unification in 1990, however, interest rates increased strongly.
As for fiscal policy, the objective of the tax measures was initially twofold: The overall tax
burden was to be shifted towards indirect taxes in order to reduce distortions in the economy. On top
of that the government was aiming for a balanced budget, to be achieved mainly through expenditure
cuts. This restrictive stance was relaxed towards the end of the 1980s. To make up for tax losses in
the downturn of the early 1990s, some tax cuts were reversed. Mortgage interest relief was limited to
the basic rate of income tax in 1991 while previously, the government had strongly subsidized
private house ownership. Like in Sweden this policy shift exacerbated the price decline in the real
estate market.
However, while lose monetary and later also fiscal policies seem to have contributed to the boom
and subsequent tightening to the bust, instability did not result in a financial crisis.  Nevertheless,
private financial balances were severely strained and for a number of years many households, for
example, were reported to have negative equity (house value was less than the mortgage) which in
turn depressed consumption and investments.
b.  Fiscal effects via the revenue channels
As discussed above, asset prices and financial instability are likely to affect capital-gains taxes,
turnover related taxes and indirect taxes.  In the following we will calculate the revenue that we
would have expected on the basis of ￿normal￿ cyclical elasticities and the effect of discretionary
policy changes for the 1985-93 period (up to 1997 in the case of the UK).  We then compare the
findings with actual revenue. We argue that the unexplained residual is likely to be (at least partly)
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asset price cycle.
10
Calculations over time and revenue categories are based on the following formula:
Boom:                 Bust:
 90                   93/7
∑  Tresij  =  ∑ (Tactij - Tpredij)    ∑  Tresij  =  ∑ (Tactij - Tpredij)
i=85                  i=91
where:
Tpredij = Tpredi-1,j * [1 + (baseij - basei-1,j *ej)] + Tdisij
                               basei-1,j
Tres = residual revenue
Tact = actual revenue
Tpred = predicted revenue (base year where Tpred=Tact is 1984)
Tdis = effect of discretionary measures
Base = tax base
e = elasticity of tax revenue with respect to base
i = period
j = tax category
The effects of asset prices on revenue will be presented in two ways.  We will first calculate
the cumulative positive/negative effect on revenue from asset price changes for each revenue
category and as a total over all four categories for both countries.  We will then present the fiscal
balance path as it actually occurred and as we conjecture it would have occurred, had asset price
effects been absent (in the case of Sweden including bail-out costs from the financial crisis).
Direct household taxes.  Starting with Sweden, the asset price boom of the late 1980s
resulted in significant accrued and realised capital gains.  This, in turn, boosted direct household
                                                         
10 ￿Elasticities for different fiscal categories are based on international organisation estimates and are assumed to have been
constant over the observation period.  These and data sources for the case studies are reported in Annex Table 1.  Details on
the fiscal effects of Swedish discretionary measures can be found in Swedish Ministry of  Finance (1989 and 1995 (2)) and
Kristofferson (1995).  For the period after 1993, such data was not available so that the Swedish case study does not
consider later years.  In the United Kingdom, data on discretionary measures was taken from the annual budget documents.
For data underlying the subsequent analysis and for an account of Sweden￿s tax reforms, see Annex Tables 1 and 2.
Note, however, that residuals may also capture other factors:  elasticities are not necessarily stable over time.  Income tax
elasticities in particular  might have been higher during the boom due to strong tax progressivity and lower in the downturn.
While this might reduce the overshooting and undershooting of household taxes it cannot explain the same pattern in other
tax categories.
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11 Table
3 reports that by 1989, five percent of factor income was due to realised capital gains.  Although
accrued capital gains became negative from 1991, the carry over effect from buying more ￿cheaply￿
in the past still resulted in some capital gains revenue in 1992.   We hence expect that capital gains
related revenue peaked in 1989/90 and then fell.
Unfortunately, Sweden does not report detailed data on capital gains related revenue.
Therefore, we applied the above-mentioned methodology and calculated the residual between the
expected and actual direct tax revenue.  The expected revenue was calculated from the change in the
base (compensation of employees), the cyclical elasticity and discretionary policy changes.  We find
that annual revenue overshooting (i.e. revenue above what could have been expected from cyclical
and discretionary factors alone) reached up to 1.1 percent of GDP in 1988 (Table 4a, see end of
document). Rising interest rates thereafter probably increased household tax deductions and
depressed revenue￿despite continued positive capital gains.
Table 3: Sweden, Composition of Aggregate Factor Income and Share of Accrued Capital
Gains (in % of Factor Income)
Income categories 1980 1985 1989 1991 1992
Wages 89.6 87.3 85.7 87.1 88.9
Entrepreneurial income 3.4 3.8 3.0 2.2 2.0
Interest and dividends 6.2 7.8 6.3 5.8 6.7
Realized capital gains 0.8 1.0 5.1 4.9 2.2
Factor income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Accrued capital gains -13.1 2.0 22.3 -3.9 -23.2
Source: Agell, Englund, Soedersten (1998)
Cumulative revenue overshooting in this category amounted to 3.3 percent of GDP for the
1985-90 period.  In the subsequent downturn, revenue undershot the projected level but only slightly.
This is probably at least partly due to the fact that realized capital gains stayed positive at until 1992.
                                                         
11 Before the 1990/91 tax reform personal income taxation was global, i.e. labour and capital income (also realised capital
gains) were taxed jointly at the same rate of the progressive tax schedule. In this system negative capital income, i.e.
interest payments, was deductible from labour income and thus reduced the marginal tax rate. This mechanism worked like
a subsidy and stimulated household borrowing. In 1990/91 there was a major change, implying that negative capital income
tax (i.e. the individual reported a capital deficit) was deducted from the overall tax liability and not from labour income.
Positive capital income was to be taxed at a uniform rate of 30 per cent. This means a change from global to dual taxation
of labour and capital income.
Note also that the Swedish experience shows the possible adverse revenue effects of ill-conceived tax
increases.  Instead of raising revenue, the tax reforms lowered revenue at least temporarily via exacerbating the
asset price fall in the bust. However, it is not clear and probably unlikely that enough of the asset price fall was
due to fiscal changes so that one could talk of a Laffer curve phenomenon.
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of over- and undershooting with the latter more pronounced than in the case of Sweden.  Revenue
exceeded what could have been expected by a cumulative 3 … percent during the boom and
undershot it by 2 ‰ percent in the subsequent downturn.
Corporate income tax revenue in Sweden results from a flat rate which has been reduced
several times between 1980 and 1991 along with broadenings of the tax base. Before 1990 not only
realized but also accrued capital gains were taxed. This explains to some extent why corporate
income tax revenue for 1985-1990 exceeded the expected value by a very high 3.1 percent of GDP
(compared to the base, gross operating surplus).  This is indicative of strong effects outside operating
surplus, i.e. capital gains, boosting revenue. Overshooting peaked in 1989 at 1.1 percent of GDP
(Table 4b).  Between 1990 and 1993, the corporate income tax ￿overshooting￿ was more than
reversed and undershooting peaked at 0.5 percent of GDP in 1992.  Note again the imbalance
between over- and undershooting.  Corporate income tax revenue probably would have undershot
expected revenue much more strongly if it had not been for two factors: if the tax system had not
changed away from an accrual based system and if the full balance sheet losses in the private sector,
especially banks, had fed through to profits and taxes rather than being absorbed by government. We
will return to this latter point below.
Again the pattern is very similar in the UK (Table 5b).  First revenue overshot, though at a
cumulative 1.9 percent of GDP somewhat less than in Sweden.  The subsequent undershooting,
however, was very large at a cumulative 4.8% and a peak of 1.3 percent in 1993. The main
explanation of the difference in the downturn phase is probably that the full balance sheet losses in
the UK had to be absorbed by the private sector rather than by government.
12.
Turning to asset turnover taxes in Sweden, we can observe a strong increase in revenue up
to 1989/90 and a subsequent steep fall until 1993. Table 4c provides more details on the development
of the two categories.  Assuming average (=￿neutral￿) revenue of about 0.3 percent of GDP for
1975-93 for financial and capital transactions, the cumulative excess revenue increase for 1985-90
was 0.5 percent.  Revenue for this category continued to stay marginally above average until 1993.
                                                         
12 For both the boom and the bust periods, the OECD already observed that corporate tax revenue development
cannot be fully explained by profits and discretionary policy measures, though no reference to the arguments
presented here is made (see OECD Economic Surveys 1986/87 and 1992/93).
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4d).
13
In the United Kingdom, both tax categories are reported together.  The same analysis as for
Sweden reveals that such taxes stayed above the long term trend even during the downturn, if only
marginally.  This is probably due to the lagged effect of asset price increases on turnover taxes but it
could also be due to tax changes which has led us to underestimate the relevant ￿average￿ tax base.
14
When looking at indirect tax revenue developments in Sweden, we observe an increase in
private consumption above disposable income until 1989 and lower consumption for subsequent
years.
15 Table 4e translates these figures into approximations of revenue deviations due to wealth
effects.  Between 1985 and 1990, cumulative revenue exceeded the projected level by 2.8 percent of
GDP.  In 1989, excess revenue peaked at 0.9 percent of GDP.  By 1990, rising interest rates had
started depressing consumption quite strongly and indirect tax revenue fell below trend in the
following year.  During the ￿bust￿ years 1991-93, cumulative undershooting of revenue was 1.6
percent, and the trough was reached in 1993.
In the United Kingdom (Table 5d), private consumption increased disproportionately during the
late 1980s boom and consequently revenue as well.  The related indirect tax revenue overshooting
peaked at ￿ percent of GDP in 1988 and added up to 2 ‰ percent over the whole boom period.  The
reversal during the downturn was almost symmetrical and resulted in cumulative revenue
undershooting of 2 ‰ percent. The (pro-cyclical) VAT increase during the downturn may have
contributed to the undershooting of consumption and, thereby, indirect tax revenue.
When adding up the unexplained residuals to what is presumably the total annual and cumulative
impact of asset price changes and financial instability on revenue, both countries show remarkable
figures.  The asset price boom in Sweden seems to have led to significant revenue overshooting.
According to our methodology, the cumulative effect was 8.2 percent of GDP over the 6-year boom
period 1985-1990 with the peak differing across revenue categories and the strongest effect in 1988
                                                         
13 Turnover taxes were only introduced in 1984 with revenue reaching 0.14 % of GDP in 1985.  This was also
assumed to be the ￿neutral￿ revenue for calculating residuals.
14 During the boom, however, revenue from turnover taxes rose sharply because of a rapidly expanding
securities turnover and rising securities and house prices (see OECD Economic Survey 1986/87).
15 To calculate the residual between expected and actual revenue, we adjusted expected revenue by the
difference between indirect tax revenue and private consumption as the impact of discretionary measures and
possible shifts in the consumption pattern.  The residual between the two lines, therefore, strictly reflects
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by 3.0 percent of GDP more than could have been expected from cyclical and discretionary measures
alone (Table 4f). The peak in revenue undershooting was in 1992/93 at 1 ‰ percent in each year.
This finding changes the picture of Sweden￿s fiscal position during the late 1980s and early
1990s quite significantly: subtracting asset price effects, fiscal balances in 1987-90 would have been
significantly worse than what can be explained by cyclical and discretionary factors.  Similarly, asset
price effects are argued to explain part of the strong deterioration of fiscal balances in 1992 and
1993. Between peak and trough, a fiscal balance deterioration of about 4 percent of GDP cannot be
explained by cyclical effects or discretionary measures, and our conjecture is that much if not all of
this was due to financial instability/asset price related effects on revenue. Chart 4 at the end of the
document (the difference between the bold and the dotted line) presents the actual and ￿asset price
adjusted￿ fiscal balance for Sweden and illustrates the significant differences over the period.
There is a clear asymmetry between over- and undershooting. The main explanation, as
mentioned, could be that the government covered a substantial amount of balance sheet losses,
thereby partly offsetting losses that would otherwise have fed through corporate profits, incomes and
consumption (and thereby leading to more revenue undershooting).  Although our series end in 1993
and a detailed numerical analysis for the following years was not possible, we know that revenue and
fiscal balances subsequently recovered (as did asset prices and the real economy).
As could be induced from the discussion by category, revenue effects over all categories and
over time were also substantial in the UK.  Overshooting peaked at 2.4 percent of GDP in 1989 and
undershooting at 2.3 percent in 1993 (Table 5e). This more symmetrical development may reflect the
absence of a bailout in the UK (hence it took longer to repair private financial balances and to let
losses feed through the fiscal accounts) and the fact that asset prices, in particular real estate prices,
remained subdued much longer in the UK than in Sweden.
As to the hypothetical fiscal balance in the absence of financial instability, Chart 4 presents a
similar picture for the UK as for Sweden. Fiscal balances would have been much worse in the late
1980s and much better in the early 1990s if it had not been for the ￿boom-bust cycle￿ and its revenue
effects as argued above.  The line reflecting the asset price and instability adjusted deficit is much
                                                                                                                                                                                 
differences in the developments between private consumption and disposable income, which could be
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the trough is only about 5 percent of GDP￿half the total deterioration in the ￿unadjusted￿ fiscal
balance of 9 percent of GDP over the same period.
In summary, the revenue (channel 1) effects of asset price changes and resulting financial
instability in Sweden and the United Kingdom appear to have been very significant.  In Sweden, the
extra revenue during the upswing is estimated at about 8 percent of GDP while the revenue
undershooting excluding bank support in the downturn amounted to roughly 3 percent of GDP.  In
the case of the United Kingdom, over- and undershooting are estimated at nearly balanced at 9
percent of GDP.  The volatility of fiscal balances appears to have been much exacerbated through
these effects.
c.  Bailout-costs: fiscal effects of Sweden￿s financial crisis
This section is limited to the analysis of Sweden￿s bailout costs, as the UK government did not
undertake any significant takeovers of balance sheet losses.  The strong asset price declines in the
downturn resulted in significant balance sheet losses in Sweden￿s economy.  The government came
to the rescue of the financial sector and paid kronor 65.3 billion or about 4 ‰ percent of GDP to
support the banking system during 1991-93.
16  However, of this total only about 90 percent were
charged to the budget.  Moreover, since financial support was first recorded as a financial transaction
it did mostly not show up in Sweden￿s deficit before 1992 and 1993 and strong inflation had reduced
the GDP value of the bank support by the time it was regularised.  Hence, the regularisation of bank
support that increased the deficit ￿only￿ amounted to 3.4 percent of GDP. If it had not been for the
regularisation of bank support, the Swedish deficit would have been 0.7 and 2.7 percent of GDP
lower in 1992 and 1993 respectively (Chart 4, thin line).  Or in other words, budgetary bank support
further increased the downturn (and thereby the variability) of fiscal accounts in the early 1990s.
Annex table 3 provides details on the Swedish government￿s commitments, payments and budgetary
recording of financial sector support.
17
                                                                                                                                                                                 
interpreted as the wealth effect.
16 For details of the financial crisis and its resolution see Englund (1999), Ingves/Lind (1996), Drees/Pazarbazioglu (1998),
Swedish Ministry of Finance (1995(2)) and the studies by Jonung et al.
17 Note that most of the public support was paid back by 1997, hence in the end reducing the net fiscal costs of the banking
crisis. Net losses amounted to half a percent of GDP in nominal terms and 2 percent of GDP when taking into account
forgone interest.  This speaks in favour of the hypotheses that public support of the banking sector in Sweden served￿at
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significant loan losses and local housing companies which often needed ￿bailing out￿ (Roennberg,
2002; Jonung and Stymne, 1997).  Such fiscal costs (which to our knowledge were not regularised in
the budget) amounted to kronor 34 billion or over 2% of GDP over the 1990s (Roennberg, 2002).
There are indications that 1/3 to  1/2 of this total or about 1% of GDP affected public debt without
being regularised in the budget up to 1993.  These costs, hence, add to the fiscal costs of instability
but did not affect the downturn/variability of the deficit.
d. Second round effects and putting fiscal costs via the three channels together
In order to make a full assessment of the fiscal effects of the Swedish and UK financial
instability episodes, it is also necessary to estimate second round effects via the fiscal costs due to
instability related output loss and via higher debt service costs.  We can only approximate the former
very crudely, following a similar method as applied by Honohan and Klingebiel (2000), Hoggarth,
Reis and Saporta (2002) and Eichengreen and Bordo (2002).  These two studies look at the
cumulative output loss over the ￿bust￿ period (measured at 10% and 7% of GDP for Sweden for
1990-93 and the UK for 1990-97 respectively, as mentioned above). This would need to be
multiplied with the sensitivity of fiscal balances to output loss, i.e., 0.7 in the case of Sweden and 0.5
in the United Kingdom, yielding 7% of GDP in the case of Sweden and about 3.5% of GDP for the
UK.
18
As to changes in the interest burden, the costs for the period in question were rather limited.
The post-boom increase in the UK interest burden peaked at 0.8% in 1995 and was a cumulative
2.0% up to 1997.  Sweden￿s interest burden increased by 0.9% of GDP in 1993 as compared to 1990.
This is also the cumulative effect over the three year period as the interest burden at first came
down.
19
Table 6 summarises the findings on the costs of fiscal instability via the three channels. In
the case of Sweden, costs add up to 16.3% of GDP and in the case of the UK to 14.5% of GDP.  This
                                                                                                                                                                                 
least partly￿an insurance function (see Jennergren and Naeslund (1998) for an attempt at assessing net costs of the
financial crisis).
18 Output loss data is calculated from difference between actual growth and trend growth (we use the average growth rate of
trend GDP measured for the 10 years preceding the crisis), as provided by OECD; budgetary elasticities are from Van den
Noord (2000) and Bouthevillain et.al (2001).  Note that this approach assigns all the output loss to second round effects
which, although consistent with the literature, is thereby clearly an upperbound estimate of the fiscal costs of such effects.
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and where Sweden￿s fiscal costs are only estimated at roughly 4% of GDP. When we also correct the
earlier Chart 4 for the second-round effect via interest payments on growing public debt, an even
larger share of the variability of fiscal accounts is related to the instability episodes in the two
countries.
Table 6: Fiscal costs of financial instability in Sweden and the United Kingdom (% of GDP)
Sweden United Kingdom
Revenue effects  3.0  9.0
Bank bailout costs  4.4  --
Other bailout costs (mortgage institutions etc) ~1.0  --
Second round effects via output ~7.2  ~3.5
Second-round effects via public interest expenditure  0.9  2.0
Total ~16.3 ~14.5
Nevertheless, one could argue that the net fiscal effects of financial instability over boom
and bust are perhaps not very grave as extra revenue during the boom compensates at least for some
of the costs in the bust. Hence there is perhaps nothing to worry about apart from more fiscal
volatility.  This, however, is probably an error.  Second round effects on output are not likely to be
fully symmetrical. In fact, both countries report much more significantly negative growth during the
downturn than growth overshooting during the upturn.  Moreover, the boom itself is likely to lead to
mal-investment and hence an inefficient and output-reducing allocation of resources.  Finally, fiscal
effects are not likely to be symmetrical over a ￿boom-bust￿ cycle.  Bail-out costs in the bust are
without counterpart in the boom.  Governments are tempted to treat the extra revenue during the
boom as permanent rather than as temporary. As a result they are likely to spend all or part of the
money.  Witness the much larger fiscal deficits in the downturn than surpluses during the boom as
experienced by these two countries. This claim and the finding of significant fiscal costs of financial
instability will find further support in the following section when we examine more episodes with
significant financial instability.
                                                                                                                                                                                 
19 However, after 1993 the interest burden continued to grow strongly to a peak of 3.4% of GDP above the 1990
ratio.  This constitutes the price of a higher debt ratio and, thereby, a delayed fiscal costs of financial instability.
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In the previous section we looked at two case studies to estimate the fiscal costs of asset
price changes and financial instability, seperating the fiscal effects via three transmission channels.
In this section, we will apply a different approach and assess the fiscal costs of episodes of important
financial instability by looking at public debt developments. The results confirm the earlier findings
of the case studies.
Public debt developments are important to analyse when assessing the full short term and in
particular the long term fiscal costs of financial instability.  We noted earlier that the full costs of
financial instability and especially those related to bailouts are often not reflected in fiscal balance
figures.  Instead, recapitalisations and other bailout costs often only feature under financial
transaction (below the line) so that such costs affect the debt but not the deficit.  Moreover, the
public debt level is a most relevant indicator for the long term sustainability of public finances.
We, therefore, look at debt developments in six industrialised countries which experienced
significant asset price cycles with financial instability or even financial crisis in the early 1990s.
These episodes are characterised by a remarkably similar pattern for fiscal balances, growth and
asset price developments, which have already been reported for the two case studies, i.e. Sweden and
the UK above. Before the fiscal deterioration, there is a period of relatively strong growth, improving
and often very favourable fiscal balances and strong asset price increases.  This is followed by a
strong downturn where growth, fiscal balances and asset prices adjust strongly (Annex table 4
provides more details). Even though public deficits come down eventually in all these episodes
(except Japan), public debt is significantly higher after the boom-bust cycle than before.
Table 7 illustrates output loss and debt developments in these financial instability episodes.
Note that debt increased significantly and rapidly in all countries.  In Finland and Japan, public debt
increased by over 40 percent of GDP.  In the other four countries, public debt increased by 12.6 to
28.6% of GDP. These figures by themselves are a useful measure of the deterioration of public
accounts in periods of financial instability and the revealed magnitude is sometimes staggering and
much higher than what can be explained economic and deficit developments alone.  However, they
exaggerate the fiscal costs as slowing or even negative growth gives rise to a debt-ratio-increasing
V. 
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Column (5) presents the total debt ratio at the end of the instability period if GDP had been higher by
the percentage of output loss.  With higher GDP, the debt ratio and its increase would have been
lower.  This yields the increase in adjusted debt (col. 6).  These figures are more moderate,
suggesting fiscal costs of 10-30 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, they confirm that financial instability
has hence been a relatively rare but very important determinant of the deterioration of public
accounts in industrialised countries over the past 20 years.
















(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) =
(5)/(1+(2))
(7)
Sweden 90-93 10.3 31.0 73.7 66.8 24.1
Finland 90-93 22.2 41.7 56.0 45.8 31.5
Japan 91-99 22.8 50.7 115.3 93.9 29.3
France 92-95 5.2 14.6 59.3 56.4 11.7
UK 90-97 6.9 16.1 58.1 54.3 12.2
Switzerland 90-93 5.1 11.4 46.0 43.8 9.2
Source: compiled from OECD, 2001 and Swiss
Ministry of Finance
We can now also pull together the findings from this section and compare them to the results
of the case studies and the estimates of financial crisis costs of earlier literature (Table 8).  The first
two columns repeat the findings from Table 7 on the six instability episodes as measured via debt
developments.  Column 3 recalls that the case studies produced double-digit fiscal costs for the UK
and Sweden.  For both countries, there are some though not major differences between the two
approaches. Note also the much larger fiscal costs resulting from the two approaches (columns 2 and
3) as compared to the bailout costs alone (4).  The latter are typically only a fraction of the full fiscal
costs of instability.
Japan and the nordic countries may also be good examples of how important it is to enter a
crisis with relatively low debt levels (Finland and Sweden did, Japan did not) and how important a
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Honohan and Klingebiel, 2000).












(1) (2) (3) (3)
Sweden 90-93 31.0 24.1 16.7 4.0-4.4
Finland 90-93 41.7 31.5 ￿ 8.0
Japan 91-99 50.7 29.3 ￿ 5.1 1/
France 92-95 14.6 11.7 ￿ 0.7
UK 90-97 16.1 12.2 14.5 ￿
Switzerland 90-93 11.4 9.2 ￿ ￿
Source:  OECD, Table 6, Honahon & Klingebiel, 2000, IMF, own computations.
1/ 1998-2000 only.
In this paper we have attempted to provide a comprehensive analysis of the fiscal effects of
asset price changes and financial instability and what their fiscal costs in terms of GDP are. We have
first identified the channels by which asset price changes and financial instability affect fiscal
balances: 1) revenue effects via taxation of capital gains and turnover and indirect tax revenue from
wealth effects on consumption; 2) the budgetary/fiscal costs of government bailouts as balance sheet
losses undermine bank and corporate solvency; and 3) second round effects from wealth/balance
sheet effects on public finances via investment, consumption and employment and via changes in
debt-servicing costs.
We argue that this 3-channel approach allows a much more complete assessment of fiscal
effects of major asset price and financial instability than previous measures of fiscal costs for bank
bailouts alone.  In order to examine this claim empirically, we first conduct a panel analysis. This
has confirmed the relevance of such variables for explaining fiscal deficits and debt in 20
industrialised countries for the 1982 to 2001 period.  Moreover, two case studies of Sweden and the
United Kingdom have analysed the boom-bust-cycle of the late 1980s-early 1990s. The two
countries experienced a dramatic deterioration in fiscal balances by 9 and almost 16 % of GDP
respectively.  We find that 40-50% of the fiscal balance deterioration in the two countries was at
least partly if not fully due to asset price and financial instability-related effects on revenue and
VI.  Conclusion
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at 14.5 and 16.3% of GDP for the UK and Sweden respectively.
Another useful (and readily available) indicator of the fiscal costs of financial instability is
the change in the public debt ratio. The study looked at six episodes of financial instability/financial
crisis in industrialised countries and found that debt ratios increased significantly by 11 to 50 % of
GDP during period of financial instability.  Even when adjusting such figures for denominator effect
of lower growth, fiscal costs measured in such a way range from almost 10 to 32% of GDP. For both
Sweden and the United Kingdom, there are some but not major differences between these figures
and those calculated in the case studies. When applying the two approaches proposed here, it turns
out that fiscal costs of bank bailouts alone are only a fraction of the full fiscal costs of instability.
In short, important asset price changes and financial instability can have major effects on
fiscal accounts, raising the variability of fiscal accounts and the public debt ratio.  Especially when
there is a full-fledged ￿crisis￿ and when the debt stock at the outset is high, the rapid and major
deterioration of the fiscal deficit and the strong increase in public debt can undermine the stability
and sustainability of public finances.  These two features of many instability episodes provide further
justification for the EU Stability and Growth Pact￿s deficit target of ￿close to balance or in surplus￿.
The latter provides some safety margin for fiscal balance deteriorations (even if sometimes not
enough to prevent large deficits).  It also implies a continuous decline in public debt which, together
with the Maastricht Treaty￿s debt ceiling of 60% of GDP, generates a safety margin against the
potential threat to sustainability from large debt increases.
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ECB • Working Paper No 191 • November 2002 34Annex Table 1: Documentation of datasources in microanalysis UK and Sweden
Sweden UK




Gross operating surplus AMECO AMECO
Private consumption AMECO AMECO
Disposable income OECD OECD
Elasticity direct taxes on
households
1.15 (estimate ECB, period
1971-1998)
1.11 (estimate ECB, period 1981-
2000)*
Other elasticities assumed 1, because of flat
rates
assumed 1, because of flat rates
Discretionary measures Swedish Ministry of Finance UK Treasury (Budget Red Book)
* A shorter period was chosen because of fiscal reforms undertaken in the 1970s & early 1980s.
Annex Table 2: Sweden, General Government Fiscal Policy Measures 1991-93
Discretionary fiscal policy measures
20 of 1991 1992 1993
general government 1991-93 (billion SKr)
Revenue Categories
Tax reform 1991 -11.7 -2.4 -0.8
Other changes in tax legislation -7.4 -10.7 +5.6
Interest and capital income, net -0.9 +8.5 -16.9
Expenditure Categories
Housing subsidies -6.9 -4.7 -8.8




Contributions to organisations +0.8
Corporate health care +1.2
Industry subsidies +1.1





Public consumption -12.9 +2.5 +2.5
Public investment -3.6 -0.4 -1.2
Capital transfers -3.3 -2.1 +5.4
Sum of discretionary measures (nominal) -43.7 -15.3 -1.4
Sum of discretionary measures (% of GDP) -3.0 -1.1 -0.1
Cumulative effect (% of GDP) -3.0 -4.1 -4.2
 Source: Swedish Ministry of Finance
Note: The table is based on calculations by the Ministry of Finance. Negative numbers imply expansionary policies.
                                                         
20 A minus indicates an increase in expenditure or a decrease in revenue and a plus stands for a decrease in
expenditure or an increase in revenue
ECB • Working Paper No 191 • November 2002 35Annex table 3: Sweden: Gross Bailout Costs 1991-93 (millions of kronor)












  Share subscription
  Share purchase




























  Capital contribution
  Guarantee shareholders￿
  Equity
20,000
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     231
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  Capital adequacy
  Protection  2,500   No   no
Total bank support

















    over 2% 1/
60,505
Source: Roennberg, 2002; Swedish Ministry of Finance (1995 (1)) , Drees/Pazarbasioglu (1998)
1/ Determination of percentage difficult as exact timing an detailed numbers not fully known.
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Countries 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Sweden
fiscal balance -2.9 -3.7 -1.2 4.1 3.4 5.2 4.0 -1.1 -7.5 -11.8
GDP growth 4.0 2.0 2.4 3.0 1.7 2.7 1.6 -1.1 -1.6 -2.4
real estate price index 100.0 96.7 97.9 106.2 118.9 131.3 133.4 130.3 115.6 98.0
stock price index 100.0 116.9 169.3 149.6 214.7 251.0 156.9 151.2 146.9 215.6
Finland
fiscal balance 4.0 3.8 3.8 1.3 4.0 6.1 5.4 -1.1 -5.5 -7.1
GDP growth 3.1 3.4 2.4 4.1 4.9 5.5 -0.5 -5.9 -3.2 -0.6
real estate price index 100.0 99.5 100.6 107.4 137.7 158.2 140.9 116.3 93.7 83.7
stock price index 100.0 84.0 124.8 187.0 220.5 226.8 154.4 101.3 67.0 125.1
Japan
fiscal balance -2.1 -0.8 -0.9 0.5 1.5 2.5 2.9 2.9 1.5 -1.6 -2.3 -3.6 -4.2 -3.4 -6.0 -7.6
GDP growth 3.9 4.4 2.9 4.2 6.2 4.8 5.1 3.8 1.0 0.3 0.6 1.5 5.1 1.4 -2.8 1.4
real estate price index 100.0 100.5 102.2 109.2 115.2 120.3 133.2 136.5 129.4 122.0 118.1 116.4 114.0 110.5 108.2 105.7
stock price index 100.0 116.5 151.0 213.4 247.0 304.4 255.7 204.2 150.2 155.7 161.3 140.7 170.7 146.2 121.5 133.2
France
fiscal balance -2.8 -3.0 -2.8 -1.9 -1.7 -1.3 -1.6 -2.2 -4.2 -6.0 -5.6 -5.6
GDP growth 1.3 1.9 2.0 2.5 4.2 4.3 2.6 1.1 1.4 -1.0 1.8 1.8
real estate price index 100.0 100.3 105.4 112.1 119.8 125.8 130.5 130.7 125.2 121.5 119.2 113.9
stock price index 100.0 122.3 198.3 223.6 189.2 259.8 268.6 233.3 230.5 257.8 275.8 260.3
UK
fiscal balance -4.0 -2.9 -2.6 -1.9 0.6 0.9 -1.5 -2.8 -6.5 -8.0
GDP growth 2.3 3.8 4.2 4.4 5.2 2.1 0.6 -1.5 0.1 2.3
real estate price index 100.0 103.3 112.8 126.4 153.5 172.5 158.2 144.5 132.5 125.9
stock price index 100.0 116.3 138.3 173.9 150.5 168.8 154.1 155.3 153.0 176.0
Switzerland
fiscal balance -0.4 -0.2 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.4 -2.1 -3.4 -3.6
GDP growth 1.8 3.4 1.6 0.7 3.1 4.3 3.7 -0.8 -0.1 -0.5
real estate price index 100.0 101.5 106.7 112.6 126.3 137.5 131.2 122.0 112.2 103.2
stock price index 100.0 123.8 157.8 149.7 124.2 147.1 132.0 125.9 129.2 159.4
Source: compiled from OECD, BIS, Datastream and own calculations
real estate price index and stock price index are CPI adjusted, base year is 1984 (=100)
white column= turning point, light column= boom, dark column= bust
Data Appendix: Sources of Data used in Panel Analysis
Variable Source
Change in Deficit (% of GDP) OECD, Swiss Ministry of Finance
Change in Debt (% of GDP) OECD, Swiss Ministry of Finance
Real output growth (annual %) OECD
Change in interest (% of GDP) OECD
Change in stock prices, defl. Datastream, BIS (Sweden), IFC (Portugal, Greece)
Change in property prices, defl. BIS
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a. Direct taxes on households
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Actual revenue (1) 19.23 19.91 20.53 21.26 21.68 21.3 17.89 17.78 17.51
D i s c r e t i o n a r y  p o l i c i e s  ( c u r r e n t  y e a r )  ( 2 ) 00000 - 1 - 2 . 4 0 . 0 8 0 . 3
D i s c r e t i o n a r y  p o l i c i e s  ( c u m u l a t i v e )  ( 3 ) 00000 - 1 - 3 . 4 - 3 . 3 2 - 3 . 0 2
Actual revenue excluding discretionary policies (1)-(3)=(4) 19.23 19.91 20.53 21.26 21.68 22.30 21.29 21.10 20.53
Predicted revenue based on changes in tax base* (5) 19.31 19.62 19.88 20.19 20.94 21.71 21.61 21.37 20.22
annual over-/undershooting (6)=(4)-(5) -0.08 0.29 0.65 1.07 0.74 0.59 -0.32 -0.27 0.31
sum of over-/undershooting 85-90 (7) -0.08 0.21 0.86 1.93 2.67 3.26
sum of over-/undershooting 91-93 (8) -0.32 -0.59 -0.28
* An elasticity of  tax revenue with respect to the base of 1.15 is assumed
b. Corporate income taxes
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Actual revenue (1) 1.75 2.5 2.3 2.87 2.1 1.74 1.87 1.46 2.16
D i s c r e t i o n a r y  p o l i c i e s  ( c u r r e n t  y e a r )  ( 2 ) 0000000 0 . 2 8 0 . 3 3
D i s c r e t i o n a r y  p o l i c i e s  ( c u m u l a t i v e )  ( 3 ) 0000000 0 . 2 8 0 . 6 1
Actual revenue excluding discretionary policies (1)-(3)=(4) 1.75 2.50 2.30 2.87 2.10 1.74 1.87 1.18 1.55
Predicted revenue based on changes in tax base* (5) 1.78 1.74 1.69 1.71 1.66 1.53 1.57 1.72 1.81
annual over-/undershooting (6)=(4)-(5) -0.03 0.76 0.61 1.16 0.44 0.21 0.30 -0.54 -0.26
sum of over-/undershooting 85-90 (7) -0.03 0.73 1.34 2.50 2.94 3.15
sum of over-/undershooting 91-93 (8) 0.30 -0.24 -0.50
* An elasticity of  tax revenue with respect to the base of 1 is assumed
c. Taxes on financial and capital transactions
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Actual revenue (1) 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.37 0.31
D i s c r e t i o n a r y  p o l i c i e s  ( c u r r e n t  y e a r )  ( 2 ) 000000000
D i s c r e t i o n a r y  p o l i c i e s  ( c u m u l a t i v e )  ( 3 ) 000000000
Actual revenue excluding discretionary policies (1)-(3)=(4) 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.37 0.31
Predicted revenue based on changes in tax base* (5) 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
annual over-/undershooting (6)=(4)-(5) -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.23 0.19 0.09 0.03
sum of over-/undershooting 85-90 (7) -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.10 0.28 0.51
sum of over-/undershooting 91-93 (8) 0.19 0.28 0.31
* Due to the lack of a tax base the average of the preceeding 20 years is considered as predicted revenue
d. Capital turnover tax
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 **
Actual revenue (1) 0.14 0.28 0.37 0.36 0.47 0.45 0.27 0.02 0
D i s c r e t i o n a r y  p o l i c i e s  ( c u r r e n t  y e a r )  ( 2 ) 00000000 N . A .
Discretionary policies (cumulative) (3) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N.A.
Actual revenue excluding discretionary policies (1)-(3)=(4) 0.14 0.28 0.37 0.36 0.47 0.45 0.27 0.02 0.00
Predicted revenue based on changes in tax base* (5) 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.00
annual over-/undershooting (6)=(4)-(5) 0.00 0.14 0.23 0.22 0.33 0.31 0.13 -0.12 0.00
sum of over-/undershooting 85-90 (7) 0.00 0.14 0.37 0.59 0.92 1.23
sum of over-/undershooting 91-93 (8) -0.01
* Due to the lack of a tax base the revenue yielded in the first year after introduction of the tax (1985) is considered as predicted revenue
** In this year the tax was abolished, we therefore consider actual and predicted revenue both as zero.
e. Indirect taxes
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Actual revenue (1) 13.31 13.13 13.57 13.39 13.41 13.88 14.17 13.22 13.22
Discretionary policies (current year) (2) 0.68 -0.24 0.16 -0.15 0.30 0.57 -0.35 -1.11 0.13
Discretionary policies (cumulative) (3) 0.68 0.43 0.60 0.45 0.75 1.32 0.97 -0.15 -0.01
Actual revenue excluding discretionary policies (1)-(3)=(4) 12.63 12.70 12.97 12.94 12.66 12.56 13.20 13.37 13.23
Predicted revenue based on changes in tax base (5) 12.65 12.58 12.33 12.07 11.81 12.23 13.28 14.10 14.04
annual over-/undershooting (6)=(4)-(5) -0.02 0.12 0.64 0.87 0.85 0.33 -0.08 -0.73 -0.81
sum of over-/undershooting 85-90 (7) -0.02 0.10 0.74 1.61 2.46 2.79
sum of over-/undershooting 91-93 (8) -0.08 -0.81 -1.62
f. All categories: over and undershooting of revenue
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
annual over-/undershooting (6)=(4)-(5) -0.14 1.19 1.53 2.54 1.69 1.34 0.22 -1.65 -1.54
sum of over-/undershooting 85-90 (7) -0.14 1.05 2.58 5.12 6.81 8.15
sum of over-/undershooting 91-97 (8) 0.22 -1.43 -2.97
* An elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the base of 1 is assumed
Wealth effects are approximated assuming an elasticity of private consumption with respect to disposable income of 1 as normal, 
deviations from this are treated as resulting from asset price changes
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(all values in % of GDP)
a. Direct taxes on households
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Actual revenue (1) 10.27 10.26 9.94 9.93 9.91 10.47 10.18 9.91 9.36 9.56 9.82 9.31 9.09
Discretionary policies (current year) (2) -0.38 -0.47 -0.19 -0.40 -0.69 0.01 0.07 0.12 -0.21 0.06 0.08 -0.04 -0.42
Discretionary policies (cumulative) (3) -0.38 -0.82 -0.94 -1.25 -1.83 -1.70 -1.56 -1.38 -1.52 -1.37 -1.22 -1.20 -1.55
Actual revenue excluding discretionary policies (1)-(3)=(4) 10.65 11.08 10.89 11.18 11.73 12.17 11.74 11.30 10.88 10.93 11.04 10.51 10.64
Predicted revenue based on changes in tax base* (5) 10.44 10.54 10.48 10.64 10.94 11.40 11.63 11.67 11.41 11.23 11.16 11.17 11.31
annual over-/undershooting (6)=(4)-(5) 0.21 0.54 0.40 0.54 0.80 0.77 0.11 -0.38 -0.53 -0.29 -0.12 -0.66 -0.67
sum of over-/undershooting 85-90 (7) 0.21 0.74 1.15 1.69 2.49 3.26
sum of over-/undershooting 91-97 (8) 0.11 -0.27 -0.80 -1.10 -1.22 -1.88 -2.55
* An elasticity of  tax revenue with respect to the base of 1.11 is assumed
b. Corporate income taxes
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Actual revenue (1) 4.60 3.80 3.72 3.86 4.35 4.04 3.27 2.67 2.46 2.73 3.32 3.77 3.95
Discretionary policies (current year) (2) -0.44 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Discretionary policies (cumulative) (3) -0.44 -0.45 -0.43 -0.45 -0.49 -0.46 -0.44 -0.48 -0.46 -0.43 -0.40 -0.39 -0.37
Actual revenue excluding discretionary policies (1)-(3)=(4) 5.04 4.25 4.16 4.32 4.84 4.50 3.70 3.16 2.92 3.16 3.72 4.16 4.31
Predicted revenue based on changes in tax base* (5) 4.30 4.16 4.25 4.23 4.18 4.13 3.99 4.04 4.23 4.36 4.40 4.50 4.44
annual over-/undershooting (6)=(4)-(5) 0.74 0.09 -0.09 0.09 0.66 0.37 -0.29 -0.88 -1.31 -1.20 -0.69 -0.34 -0.13
sum of over-/undershooting 85-90 (7) 0.74 0.83 0.74 0.83 1.48 1.85
sum of over-/undershooting 91-97 (8) -0.29 -1.17 -2.48 -3.68 -4.36 -4.71 -4.84
* An elasticity of  tax revenue with respect to the base of 1 is assumed
c. Taxes on financial and capital transactions
All values in % of GDP 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Actual revenue (1) 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.50 0.41 0.32 0.31 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.40
Discretionary policies (current year) (2) -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Discretionary policies (cumulative) (3) -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08
Actual revenue excluding discretionary policies (1)-(3)=(4) 0.45 0.57 0.67 0.60 0.52 0.43 0.41 0.27 0.33 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.48
Predicted revenue based on changes in tax base* (5) 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
annual over-/undershooting (6)=(4)-(5) 0.19 0.31 0.41 0.34 0.26 0.17 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.22
sum of over-/undershooting 85-90 (7) 0.19 0.50 0.91 1.25 1.51 1.68
sum of over-/undershooting 91-97 (8) 0.15 0.17 0.23 0.34 0.45 0.57 0.79
* Due to the lack of a tax base the average of the preceeding 20 years is considered as predicted revenue
d. Indirect taxes
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Actual revenue (1) 11.80 11.65 11.30 11.54 11.26 11.58 11.50 11.99 11.95 12.23 12.59 12.68 12.45
Discretionary policies (current year) (2) 0.20 -0.49 -0.33 0.06 -0.30 0.13 -0.27 0.36 -0.18 0.38 0.43 -0.09 -0.25
Discretionary policies (cumulative) (3) 0.20 -0.29 -0.62 -0.56 -0.86 -0.73 -1.00 -0.65 -0.83 -0.45 -0.02 -0.11 -0.36
Actual revenue excluding discretionary policies (1)-(3)=(4) 11.60 11.94 11.92 12.10 12.12 12.31 12.50 12.64 12.78 12.68 12.61 12.79 12.81
Predicted revenue based on changes in tax base* (5) 11.55 11.64 11.43 11.35 11.49 12.02 12.61 13.16 13.32 13.01 13.05 13.06 13.06
annual over-/undershooting (6)=(4)-(5) 0.05 0.31 0.49 0.75 0.63 0.29 -0.11 -0.52 -0.54 -0.33 -0.44 -0.26 -0.25
sum of over-/undershooting 85-90 (7) 0.05 0.36 0.85 1.60 2.23 2.52
sum of over-/undershooting 91-97 (8) -0.11 -0.62 -1.16 -1.49 -1.93 -2.19 -2.45
* An elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the base of 1 is assumed
Wealth effects are approximated assuming an elasticity of private consumption with respect to disposable income of 1 as normal, 
deviations from this are treated as resulting from asset price changes
e. All categories: over and undershooting of revenue
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
annual over-/undershooting (6)=(4)-(5) 1.19 1.24 1.22 1.72 2.35 1.60 -0.13 -1.76 -2.31 -1.71 -1.14 -1.14 -0.83
sum of over-/undershooting 85-90 (7) 1.19 2.43 3.65 5.36 7.71 9.31
sum of over-/undershooting 91-97 (8) -0.13 -1.89 -4.20 -5.92 -7.06 -8.20 -9.04
Sources: Financial Statement and Budget Reports (UK Treasury), OECD Revenue Statistics 1998
Base year for simulations: 1984
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Chart 2: Sweden, Real Estate Market Returns 
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Chart 3: United Kingdom, Stock Market Returns 
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Chart 4: Sweden, Actual Fiscal Balance vs. Balance 
adjusted for Asset Price Effects and Bank Support 1984-
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Chart 4: UK, Actual Fiscal Balance vs. Balance 
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